Paper 2023/823 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/823 ↗

Lattice-based Authenticated Key Exchange with Tight Security

Jiaxin Pan
Benedikt Wagner
Runzhi Zeng
Abstract

We construct the first tightly secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol from lattices. Known tight constructions are all based on Diffie-Hellman-like assumptions. Thus, our protocol is the first construction with tight security from a post-quantum assumption. Our AKE protocol is constructed tightly from a new security notion for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), called one-way security against checkable chosen-ciphertext attacks (OW- ChCCA). We show how an OW-ChCCA secure KEM can be tightly constructed based on the Learning With Errors assumption, leading to the desired AKE protocol. To show the usefulness of OW-ChCCA security beyond AKE, we use it to construct the first tightly bilateral selective-opening (BiSO) secure PKE. BiSO security is a stronger selective-opening notion proposed by Lai et al. (ASIACRYPT 2021).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-06-07: last updated
2023-06-02: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/823
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/823,
      author = {Jiaxin Pan and Benedikt Wagner and Runzhi Zeng},
      title = {Lattice-based Authenticated Key Exchange with Tight Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/823},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/823}
}
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