Paper 2023/864 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/864 ↗

Compact Selective Opening Security From LWE

Dennis Hofheinz
Kristina Hostáková
Julia Kastner
Karen Klein
Akin Ünal
Abstract

Selective opening (SO) security is a security notion for public-key encryption schemes that captures security against adaptive corruptions of senders. SO security comes in chosen-plaintext (SO-CPA) and chosen-ciphertext (SO-CCA) variants, neither of which is implied by standard security notions like IND-CPA or IND-CCA security. In this paper, we present the first SO-CCA secure encryption scheme that combines the following two properties: (1) it has a constant ciphertext expansion (i.e., ciphertexts are only larger than plaintexts by a constant factor), and (2) its security can be proven from a standard assumption. Previously, the only known SO-CCA secure encryption scheme achieving (1) was built from an ad-hoc assumption in the RSA regime. Our construction builds upon LWE, and in particular on a new and surprisingly simple construction of compact lossy trapdoor functions (LTFs). Our LTF can be converted into an “all-but-many LTF” (or ABM-LTF), which is known to be sufficient to obtain SO-CCA security. Along the way, we fix a technical problem in that previous ABM-LTF-based construction of SO-CCA security.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-01-19: last updated
2023-06-07: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/864
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/864,
      author = {Dennis Hofheinz and Kristina Hostáková and Julia Kastner and Karen Klein and Akin Ünal},
      title = {Compact Selective Opening Security From LWE},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/864},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/864}
}
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