A note on ``a multi-instance cancelable fingerprint biometric based secure session key agreement protocol employing elliptic curve cryptography and a double hash function''

Zhengjun Cao; Lihua Liu

Paper 2023/993 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/993 ↗

A note on ``a multi-instance cancelable fingerprint biometric based secure session key agreement protocol employing elliptic curve cryptography and a double hash function''

Zhengjun Cao

Lihua Liu

Abstract

We show that the key agreement scheme [Multim. Tools Appl. 80:799-829, 2021] is flawed. (1) The scheme is a hybrid which piles up various tools such as public key encryption, signature, symmetric key encryption, hash function, cancelable templates from thumb fingerprints, and elliptic curve cryptography. These tools are excessively used because key agreement is just a simple cryptographic primitive in contrast to public key encryption. (2) The involved reliance is very intricate. Especially, the requirement for a secure channel between two parties is generally unavailable.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2023-06-26: last updated; 2023-06-26: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/993
License: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/993,
      author = {Zhengjun Cao and Lihua Liu},
      title = {A note on ``a multi-instance cancelable fingerprint biometric based secure session key agreement protocol employing elliptic curve cryptography and a double hash function''},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/993},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/993}
}