Paper 2024/1000 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1000 ↗
File-Injection Attacks on Searchable Encryption, Based on Binomial Structures
Abstract
One distinguishable feature of file-inject attacks on searchable encryption schemes is the 100% query recovery rate, i.e., confirming the corresponding keyword for each query. The main efficiency consideration of file-injection attacks is the number of injected files. In the work of Zhang et al. (USENIX 2016), $|\log_2|K||$ injected files are required, each of which contains $|K|/2$ keywords for the keyword set $K$. Based on the construction of the uniform $(s,n)$-set, Wang et al. need fewer injected files when considering the threshold countermeasure. In this work, we propose a new attack that further reduces the number of injected files where Wang et al. need up to 38% more injections to achieve the same results. The attack is based on an increment $(s,n)$-set, which is also defined in this paper.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2024-08-07: last updated
- 2024-06-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1000
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1000,
author = {Tjard Langhout and Huanhuan Chen and Kaitai Liang},
title = {File-Injection Attacks on Searchable Encryption, Based on Binomial Structures},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1000},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1000}
}