Paper 2024/1003 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1003 ↗
zkVoting : Zero-knowledge proof based coercion-resistant and E2E verifiable e-voting system
Abstract
We introduce ${zkVoting}$, a coercion-resistant e-voting system that utilizes a fake keys approach based on a novel nullifiable commitment scheme. This scheme allows voters to receive both real and fake commitment keys from a registrar. Each ballot includes this commitment, but only the tallier can efficiently discern the fake ballots, simplifying the tally process to $\mathcal{O}(n)$ and ensuring coercion resistance. ${zkVoting}$ also preserves voter anonymity by ensuring each ballot conceals the voter's identity. Additionally, by integrating zero-knowledge proofs, ${zkVoting}$ achieves end-to-end (E2E) verifiability. We formally prove its security and demonstrate its practicality for real-world applications, with a ballot casting time of 2.3 seconds and a tally time of 3.9 milliseconds per ballot.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2024-06-21: last updated
- 2024-06-21: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1003
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1003,
author = {Seongho Park and Jaekyoung Choi and Jihye Kim and Hyunok Oh},
title = {zkVoting : Zero-knowledge proof based coercion-resistant and E2E verifiable e-voting system},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1003},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1003}
}