Paper 2024/1099 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1099 ↗

FHE-MENNs: Opportunities and Pitfalls for Accelerating Fully Homomorphic Private Inference with Multi-Exit Neural Networks

Lars Wolfgang Folkerts
Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
Abstract

With concerns about data privacy growing in a connected world, cryptography researchers have focused on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) for promising machine learning as a service solutions. Recent advancements have lowered the computational cost by several orders of magnitude, but the latency of fully homomorphic neural networks remains a barrier to adoption. This work proposes using multi-exit neural networks (MENNs) to accelerate the FHE inference. MENNs are network architectures that provide several exit points along the depth of the network. This approach allows users to employ results from any exit and terminate the computation early, saving both time and power. First, this work weighs the latency, communication, accuracy, and computational resource benefits of running FHE-based MENN inference. Then, we present the TorMENNt attack that can exploit the user's early termination decision to launch a concrete side-channel on MENNs. We demonstrate that the TorMENNt attack can predict the private image classification output of an image set for both FHE and plaintext threat models. We discuss possible countermeasures to mitigate the attack and examine their effectiveness. Finally, we tie the privacy risks with a cost-benefit analysis to obtain a practical roadmap for FHE-based MENN adoption.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-07-05: last updated
2024-07-05: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1099
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1099,
      author = {Lars Wolfgang Folkerts and Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos},
      title = {FHE-MENNs: Opportunities and Pitfalls for Accelerating Fully Homomorphic Private Inference with Multi-Exit Neural Networks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1099},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1099}
}
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