Paper 2024/111 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/111 ↗

A Novel Power Analysis Attack against CRYSTALS-Dilithium Implementation

Yong Liu
Yuejun Liu
Yongbin Zhou
Yiwen Gao
Zehua Qiao
Huaxin Wang
Abstract

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) was proposed due to the potential threats quantum computer attacks against conventional public key cryptosystems, and four PQC algorithms besides CRYSTALS-Dilithium (Dilithium for short) have so far been selected for NIST standardization. However, the selected algorithms are still vulnerable to side-channel attacks in practice, and their physical security need to be further evaluated. This study introduces two efficient power analysis attacks, the optimized fast two-stage approach and the single-bit approach, aimed at reducing the key guess space in NTT polynomial multiplication on an STM32F405 device (ARM Cortex-M4 core). Our findings reveal that the optimized approach outperforms the conservative approach and the fast two-stage approach proposed in ICCD 2021 by factors of 519 and 88, respectively. Similarly, the single-bit approach demonstrates speedups of 365 and 62 times compared to these two approaches, respectively.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-01-25: last updated
2024-01-25: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/111
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/111,
      author = {Yong Liu and Yuejun Liu and Yongbin Zhou and Yiwen Gao and Zehua Qiao and Huaxin Wang},
      title = {A Novel Power Analysis Attack against CRYSTALS-Dilithium Implementation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/111},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/111}
}
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