Paper 2024/1125 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1125 ↗
Revisiting PACD-based Attacks on RSA-CRT
Abstract
In this work, we use some recent developments in lattice-based cryptanalytic tools to revisit a fault attack on RSA-CRT signatures based on the Partial Approximate Common Divisor (PACD) problem. By reducing the PACD to a Hidden Number Problem (HNP) instance, we decrease the number of required faulted bits from 32 to 7 in the case of a 1024-bit RSA. We successfully apply the attack to RSA instances up to 8192-bit and present an enhanced analysis of the error-tolerance in the Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) with predicate approach. Finally, evaluating the impact of standard side-channel and fault countermeasures, we show that merely verifying the signature before output is not an adequate protection against this attack. The reduction from PACD to HNP might be of independent interest.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2024-07-10: last updated
- 2024-07-10: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1125
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1125,
author = {Guillaume Barbu and Laurent Grémy and Roch Lescuyer},
title = {Revisiting PACD-based Attacks on RSA-CRT},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1125},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1125}
}