Paper 2024/1167 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1167 ↗

Expanding the Toolbox: Coercion and Vote-Selling at Vote-Casting Revisited

Abstract

Coercion is a challenging and multi-faceted threat that prevents people from expressing their will freely. Similarly, vote-buying does to undermine the foundation of free democratic elections. These threats are especially dire for remote electronic voting, which relies on voters to express their political will freely but happens in an uncontrolled environment outside the polling station and the protection of the ballot booth. However, electronic voting in general, both in-booth and remote, faces a major challenge, namely to ensure that voters can verify that their intent is captured correctly without providing a receipt of the cast vote to the coercer or vote buyer. Even though there are known techniques to resist or partially mitigate coercion and vote-buying, we explicitly demonstrate that they generally underestimate the power of malicious actors by not accounting for current technological tools that could support coercion and vote-selling. In this paper, we give several examples of how a coercer can force voters to comply with his demands or how voters can prove how they voted. To do so, we use tools like blockchains, delay encryption, privacy-preserving smart contracts, or trusted hardware. Since some of the successful coercion attacks occur on voting schemes that were supposed/claimed/proven to be coercion-resistant or receipt-free, the main conclusion of this work is that the coercion models should be re-evaluated, and new definitions of coercion and receipt-freeness are necessary. We propose such new definitions as part of this paper and investigate their implications.