Paper 2024/1233 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1233 ↗

Binding Security of Implicitly-Rejecting KEMs and Application to BIKE and HQC

Abstract

In this work, we continue the analysis of the binding properties of implicitly-rejecting key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) obtained via the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform. These binding properties, in earlier literature known under the term robustness, thwart attacks that can arise when using KEMs in complex protocols. Recently, Cremers et al. (CCS'24) introduced a framework for binding notions, encompassing previously existing but also new ones. While implicitly-rejecting FO-KEMs have been analyzed with respect to multiple of these notions, there are still several gaps. We complete the picture by providing positive and negative results for the remaining notions. Further, we show how to apply our results to the code-based KEMs BIKE and HQC, which were round-4 candidates in NIST's PQC standardization process. Through this, we close a second gap as our results complete the analysis of the binding notions for the NIST round-4 KEMs. Finally, we give a modified version of the FO transform that achieves all binding notions.