Paper 2024/1308 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1308 ↗
LAMA: Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Microsoft Always Encrypted
Abstract
Always Encrypted (AE) is a Microsoft SQL Server feature that allows clients to encrypt sensitive data inside client applications and ensures that the sensitive data is hidden from untrusted servers and database administrators. AE offers two column-encryption options: deterministic encryption (DET) and randomized encryption (RND). In this paper, we explore the security implications of using AE with both DET and RND encryption modes by running Leakage Abuse Attacks (LAAs) against the system. We demonstrate how an adversary could extract the necessary data to run a frequency analysis LAA against DET-encrypted columns and an LAA for Order-Revealing Encryption against RND-encrypted columns. We run our attacks using real-world datasets encrypted in a full-scale AE instancer and demonstrate that a snooping server can recover over 95\% of the rows in 8 out of 15 DET-encrypted columns, and 10 out of 15 RND-encrypted columns.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2024-08-23: last updated
- 2024-08-21: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1308
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1308,
author = {Ryan Seah and Daren Khu and Alexander Hoover and Ruth Ng},
title = {LAMA: Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Microsoft Always Encrypted},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1308},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1308}
}