Paper 2024/1309 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1309 ↗

R-STELLAR: A Resilient Synthesizable Signature Attenuation SCA Protection on AES-256 with built-in Attack-on-Countermeasure Detection

Archisman Ghosh
Dong-Hyun Seo
Debayan Das
Santosh Ghosh
Shreyas Sen
Abstract

Side-channel attacks (SCAs) remain a significant threat to the security of cryptographic systems in modern embedded devices. Even mathematically secure cryptographic algorithms, when implemented in hardware, inadvertently leak information through physical side-channel signatures such as power consumption, electromagnetic (EM) radiation, light emissions, and acoustic emanations. Exploiting these side channels significantly reduces the attacker’s search space. In recent years, physical countermeasures have significantly increased the minimum traces-to-disclosure (MTD) to 1 billion. Among them, signature attenuation is the first method to achieve this mark. Signature attenuation often relies on analog techniques, and digital signature attenuation reduces MTD to 20 million, requiring additional methods for high resilience. We focus on improving the digital signature attenuation by an order of magnitude (MTD 200M).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-08-21: last updated
2024-08-21: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1309
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1309,
      author = {Archisman Ghosh and Dong-Hyun Seo and Debayan Das and Santosh Ghosh and Shreyas Sen},
      title = {R-STELLAR: A Resilient Synthesizable Signature Attenuation SCA Protection on AES-256 with built-in Attack-on-Countermeasure Detection},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1309},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1309}
}
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