Paper 2024/1322 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1322 ↗

Revisiting a Realistic EM Side-Channel Attack on a Complex Modern SoC

Abstract

Side-channel analysis on complex SoC devices with high-frequency microprocessors and multitasking operating systems presents significant challenges in practice due to the high costs of trace acquisition and analysis, generally involving tens of thousands to millions of traces. This work uses a cryptographic execution process on a Broadcom 2837 SoC as a case study to explore ways to reduce costs in electromagnetic side-channel analysis. In the data acquisition phase, we propose an efficient electromagnetic probe positioning strategy that does not require additional tool assistance, significantly accelerating the collection of effective electromagnetic traces. In the side-channel analysis phase, we investigate the combined use of preprocessing techniques, where the optimal preprocessing approach successfully reduces the number of required electromagnetic traces by 12 times, significantly improving the success rate of attacks. Additionally, we implement profiling attacks on such devices, including traditional template attacks, MLP-based, and CNN-based side-channel analysis, demonstrating that even minimal modeling costs can yield excellent analysis performance. Our study confirms the feasibility of low-cost side-channel analysis on complex SoCs and indicates that the sensitive applications running on these devices still require protection.