Coercion-resistant i-voting with short PIN and OAuth 2.0

Matteo Bitussi; Riccardo Longo; Francesco Antonio Marino; Umberto Morelli; Amir Sharif; Chiara Spadafora; Alessandro Tomasi

Paper 2024/1398 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1398 ↗

Coercion-resistant i-voting with short PIN and OAuth 2.0

Matteo Bitussi

Riccardo Longo

Francesco Antonio Marino

Umberto Morelli

Amir Sharif

Chiara Spadafora

Alessandro Tomasi

Abstract

This paper presents an architecture for an OAuth 2.0-based i-voting solution using a mobile native client in a variant of the Ara´ujo-Traor´e protocol. We follow a systematic approach by identifying relevant OAuth 2.0 specifications and best practices. Having defined our framework, we identify threats applicable to our proposed methodology and detail how our design mitigates them to provide a safer i-voting process.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Applications
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2024-09-06: last updated; 2024-09-06: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2024/1398
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1398,
      author = {Matteo Bitussi and Riccardo Longo and Francesco Antonio Marino and Umberto Morelli and Amir Sharif and Chiara Spadafora and Alessandro Tomasi},
      title = {Coercion-resistant i-voting with short PIN and OAuth 2.0},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1398},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1398}
}