Paper 2024/1400 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1400 ↗
Efficient Asymmetric PAKE Compiler from KEM and AE
Abstract
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) allows two parties to establish a secure session key with a shared low-entropy password pw. Asymmetric PAKE (aPAKE) extends PAKE in the client-server setting, and the server only stores a password file instead of the plain password so as to provide additional security guarantee when the server is compromised. In this paper, we propose a novel generic compiler from PAKE to aPAKE in the Universal Composable (UC) framework by making use of Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and Authenticated Encryption (AE). -- Our compiler admits efficient instantiations from lattice to yield lattice-based post-quantum secure aPAKE protocols. When instantiated with Kyber (the standardized KEM algorithm by the NIST), the performances of our compiler outperform other lattice-based compilers (Gentry et al. CRYPTO 2006) in all aspects, hence yielding the most efficient aPAKE compiler from lattice. In particular, when applying our compiler to the UC-secure PAKE schemes (Santos et al. EUROCRYPT 2023, Beguinet et al. ACNS 2023), we obtain the most efficient UC-secure aPAKE schemes from lattice. -- Moreover, the instantiation of our compiler from the tightly-secure matrix DDH (MDDH)-based KEM (Pan et al. CRYPTO 2023) can compile the tightly-secure % CDH-based PAKE scheme (Liu et al. PKC 2023) to a tightly-secure MDDH-based aPAKE, which serves as the first tightly UC-secure aPAKE scheme.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2024-09-07: last updated
- 2024-09-07: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1400
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1400,
author = {You Lyu and Shengli Liu and Shuai Han},
title = {Efficient Asymmetric PAKE Compiler from KEM and AE},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1400},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1400}
}