Paper 2024/157 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/157 ↗

Delphi: sharing assessments of cryptographic assumptions

Jeroen van de Graaf
Arjen K. Lenstra
Abstract

Almost all practical cryptographic protocols are based on computational or ad-hoc assumptions. Assessing the strengths of these assumptions is therefore a key factor in evaluating the risks of the systems using them. As a service to (and by) cryptographic researchers and practitioners, we developed Delphi, an online questionnaire to document researchers' opinions and beliefs about the strengths of the most important assumptions. All responses received will be made accessible on our website, ideally non-anonymous (but depending on the contributor's preference). We also intend to consolidate these responses and publish the results. We believe this effort will be of great value when deciding which cryptographic primitives to keep or start using.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-02-06: last updated
2024-02-02: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/157
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/157,
      author = {Jeroen van de Graaf and Arjen K. Lenstra},
      title = {Delphi: sharing assessments of cryptographic assumptions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/157},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/157}
}
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