Paper 2024/1581 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1581 ↗
$\mathsf{Protoss}$ Protocol for Tight Optimal Symmetric Security
Abstract
We present $\mathsf{Protoss}$, a new balanced PAKE protocol with optimal communication efficiency. Messages are only 160 bits long and the computational complexity is lower than all previous approaches. Our protocol is proven secure in the random oracle model and features a security proof in a strong security model with multiple parties and multiple sessions, while allowing for generous attack queries including multiple $\mathsf{Test}$-queries. Moreover, the proof is in the practically relevant single-bit model (that is harder to achieve than the multiple-bit model) and tightly reduces to the Strong Square Diffie-Hellman assumption (SSQRDH). This allows for very efficient, theoretically-sound instantiations and tight compositions with symmetric primitives.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-06-08: last updated
- 2024-10-07: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1581
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1581,
author = {Emanuele Di Giandomenico and Yong Li and Sven Schäge},
title = {$\mathsf{Protoss}$ Protocol for Tight Optimal Symmetric Security},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1581},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1581}
}