Paper 2024/1766 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1766 ↗

Critical Rounds in Multi-Round Proofs: Proof of Partial Knowledge and Trapdoor Commitments

Masayuki Abe
David Balbás
Dung Bui
Miyako Ohkubo
Zehua Shang
Akira Takahashi
Mehdi Tibouchi
Abstract

Zero-knowledge simulators, initially developed for proving the security of proof systems, turned out to be also useful in constructing advanced protocols from simple three-move interactive proofs. However, in the context of multi-round public-coin protocols, the interfaces of these auxiliary algorithms become more complex, introducing a range of technical challenges that hinder the generalization of these constructions. We introduce a framework to enhance the usability of zero-knowledge simulators in multi-round argument systems for protocol designs. Critical-round zero-knowledge relies on the ability to perform complete zero-knowledge simulations by knowing the challenge of just one specific round in advance. We show that these notions are satisfied by diverse protocols based on MPC-in-the-Head, interactive oracle proofs, and split-and-fold arguments. We demonstrate the usefulness of the critical round framework by constructing proofs of partial knowledge (Cramer, Damgård, and Schoenmakers, CRYPTO’94) and trapdoor commitments (Damgård, CRYPTO’89) from critical-round multi-round proofs.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-02-23: last updated
2024-10-30: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1766
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1766,
      author = {Masayuki Abe and David Balbás and Dung Bui and Miyako Ohkubo and Zehua Shang and Akira Takahashi and Mehdi Tibouchi},
      title = {Critical Rounds in Multi-Round Proofs: Proof of Partial Knowledge and Trapdoor Commitments},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1766},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1766}
}
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