Breaking BASS

Simon-Philipp Merz; Kenneth G. Paterson; Àlex Rodríguez García

Paper 2024/1808 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1808 ↗

Breaking BASS

Simon-Philipp Merz

Kenneth G. Paterson

Àlex Rodríguez García

Abstract

We provide several attacks on the BASS signature scheme introduced by Grigoriev, Ilmer, Ovchinnikov and Shpilrain in 2023. We lay out a trivial forgery attack which generates signatures passing the scheme's probabilistic signature verification with high probability. Generating these forgeries is faster than generating signatures honestly. Moreover, we describe a key-only attack which allows us to recover an equivalent private key from a signer's public key. The time complexity of this recovery is asymptotically the same as that of signing messages.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2025-12-10: last updated; 2024-11-05: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2024/1808
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1808,
      author = {Simon-Philipp Merz and Kenneth G. Paterson and Àlex Rodríguez García},
      title = {Breaking BASS},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1808},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1808}
}