Paper 2024/1902 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1902 ↗

ZK-SNARKs for Ballot Validity: A Feasibility Study

Nicolas Huber
Ralf Kuesters
Julian Liedtke
Daniel Rausch
Abstract

Electronic voting (e-voting) systems have become more prevalent in recent years, but security concerns have also increased, especially regarding the privacy and verifiability of votes. As an essential ingredient for constructing secure e-voting systems, designers often employ zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs), allowing voters to prove their votes are valid without revealing them. Invalid votes can then be discarded to protect verifiability without compromising the privacy of valid votes. General purpose zero-knowledge proofs (GPZKPs) such as ZK-SNARKs can be used to prove arbitrary statements, including ballot validity. While a specialized ZKP that is constructed only for a specific election type/voting method, ballot format, and encryption/commitment scheme can be more efficient than a GPZKP, the flexibility offered by GPZKPs would allow for quickly constructing e-voting systems for new voting methods and new ballot formats. So far, however, the viability of GPZKPs for showing ballot validity for various ballot formats, in particular, whether and in how far they are practical for voters to compute, has only recently been investigated for ballots that are computed as Pedersen vector commitments in an ACM CCS 2022 paper by Huber et al. Here, we continue this line of research by performing a feasibility study of GPZKPs for the more common case of ballots encrypted via Exponential ElGamal encryption. Specifically, building on the work by Huber et al., we describe how the Groth16 ZK-SNARK can be instantiated to show ballot validity for arbitrary election types and ballot formats encrypted via Exponential ElGamal. As our main contribution, we implement, benchmark, and compare several such instances for a wide range of voting methods and ballot formats. Our benchmarks not only establish a basis for protocol designers to make an educated choice for or against such a GPZKP, but also show that GPZKPs are actually viable for showing ballot validity in voting systems using Exponential ElGamal.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-11-22: last updated
2024-11-22: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1902
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1902,
      author = {Nicolas Huber and Ralf Kuesters and Julian Liedtke and Daniel Rausch},
      title = {ZK-SNARKs for Ballot Validity: A Feasibility Study},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1902},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1902}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.