Paper 2024/1910 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1910 ↗

Stealth Software Trojan: Amplifying Hidden RF Side-Channels with Ultra High SNR and Data-Rate

Gal Cohen
Itamar Levy
Abstract

Interconnected devices enhance daily life but introduce security vulnerabilities, new technologies enable malicious activities such as information theft. This article combines radio frequency (RF) side-channel attacks with software Trojans to create a hard-to-detect, stealthy method for extracting kilobytes of secret information per millisecond over record distances with a single measurement in the RF spectrum. The technique exploits Trojan-induced electrical disturbances in RF components originating from peripherals, buses, memories and CPUs to achieve high SNR data leakage schemes. Experimental results show negligible acquisition time and stealth. The research introduces optimized modulation, demodulation schemes, and specialized synchronization symbols to minimize error rates and maximize data rates. It highlights the need for advanced detection and defense mechanisms to ensure the security and privacy of interconnected devices.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-11-24: last updated
2024-11-24: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1910
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1910,
      author = {Gal Cohen and Itamar Levy},
      title = {Stealth Software Trojan: Amplifying Hidden RF Side-Channels with Ultra High SNR and Data-Rate},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1910},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1910}
}
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