Paper 2024/1957 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/1957 ↗
NICE-PAKE: On the Security of KEM-Based PAKE Constructions without Ideal Ciphers
Abstract
We present the No IC Encryption (NICE)-PAKE, a (semi)-generic symmetric Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) framework providing a quantum-safe alternative for the Ideal Cipher (IC), utilizing simpler cryptographic components for the authentication step. To give a formal proof, we introduce the notions of A-Part Secrecy (A-SEC-CCA), Splittable Collision Freeness (A-CFR-CCA) and Public Key Uniformity (SPLIT-PKU) for splittable LWE KEMs. We show the relation of the former to the Non-uniform LWE and the Weak-Hint LWE assumptions, as well as its application to Ring and Module LWE. Finally, we show how to obtain a secure PAKE from our construction with concrete parameter choices for lattice KEMs.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-05-15: last updated
- 2024-12-03: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1957
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1957,
author = {Nouri Alnahawi and Jacob Alperin-Sheriff and Daniel Apon and Gareth T. Davies and Alexander Wiesmaier},
title = {NICE-PAKE: On the Security of KEM-Based PAKE Constructions without Ideal Ciphers},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1957},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1957}
}