Paper 2024/277 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/277 ↗

Fault Attacks on UOV and Rainbow

Juliane Krämer
Mirjam Loiero
Abstract

Multivariate cryptography is one of the main candidates for creating post-quantum public key cryptosystems. Especially in the area of digital signatures, there exist many practical and secure multivariate schemes. The signature schemes UOV and Rainbow are two of the most promising and best studied multivariate schemes which have proven secure for more than a decade. However, so far the security of multivariate signature schemes towards physical attacks has not been appropriately assessed. Towards a better understanding of the physical security of multivariate signature schemes, this paper presents fault attacks against SingleField schemes, especially UOV and Rainbow. Our analysis shows that although promising attack vectors exist, multivariate signature schemes inherently offer a good protection against fault attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-02-19: last updated
2024-02-19: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/277
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/277,
      author = {Juliane Krämer and Mirjam Loiero},
      title = {Fault Attacks on UOV and Rainbow},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/277},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/277}
}
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