Paper 2024/596 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/596 ↗
Cryptanalysis of signature schemes based on the root extraction problem over braid group
Abstract
Cumplido, María et al. have recently shown that the Wang-Hu digital signature is not secure and has presented a potential attack on the root extraction problem. The effectiveness of generic attacks on solving this problem for braids is still uncertain and it is unknown if it is possible to create braids that require exponential time to solve these problems. In 2023, Lin and al. has proposed a post-quantum signature scheme similar to the Wang-Hu scheme that is proven to be able to withstand attacks from quantum computers. However, evidence is presented here for the existence of an algorithm based on mean-set attacks that can recover the private key in both schemes without solving the root extraction problem. In the post-quantum signature version, we prove that the attacker can forge a signature passing the verification without recovering the private key
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2024-07-25: last updated
- 2024-04-17: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/596
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/596,
author = {Djimnaibeye Sidoine and Guy Mobouale Wamba and Abiodoun Clement Hounkpevi and Tieudjo Daniel and Djiby Sow},
title = {Cryptanalysis of signature schemes based on the root extraction problem over braid group},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/596},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/596}
}