Paper 2024/754 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/754 ↗

Adversary Resilient Learned Bloom Filters

Ghada Almashaqbeh
Allison Bishop
Hayder Tirmazi
Abstract

A learned Bloom filter (LBF) combines a classical Bloom filter (CBF) with a learning model to reduce the amount of memory needed to represent a given set while achieving a target false positive rate (FPR). Provable security against adaptive adversaries that advertently attempt to increase FPR has been studied for CBFs, but not for LBFs. In this paper, we close this gap and show how to achieve adaptive security for LBFs. In particular, we define several adaptive security notions capturing varying degrees of adversarial control, including full and partial adaptivity, in addition to LBF extensions of existing adversarial models for CBFs, including the Always-Bet and Bet-or-Pass notions. We propose two secure LBF constructions, PRP-LBF and Cuckoo-LBF, and formally prove their security under these models assuming the existence of one-way functions. Based on our analysis and use case evaluations, our constructions achieve strong security guarantees while maintaining competitive FPR and memory overhead.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-09-01: last updated
2024-05-16: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/754
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/754,
      author = {Ghada Almashaqbeh and Allison Bishop and Hayder Tirmazi},
      title = {Adversary Resilient Learned Bloom Filters},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/754},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/754}
}
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