Paper 2024/863 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/863 ↗

Length Leakage in Oblivious Data Access Mechanisms

Grace Jia
Rachit Agarwal
Anurag Khandelwal
Abstract

This paper explores the problem of preventing length leakage in oblivious data access mechanisms with passive persistent adversaries. We show that designing mechanisms that prevent both length leakage and access pattern leakage requires navigating a three-way tradeoff between storage footprint, bandwidth footprint, and the information leaked to the adversary. We establish powerful lower bounds on achievable storage and bandwidth footprints for a variety of leakage profiles, and present constructions that perfectly or near-perfectly match the lower bounds.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-06-13: last updated
2024-05-31: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/863
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/863,
      author = {Grace Jia and Rachit Agarwal and Anurag Khandelwal},
      title = {Length Leakage in Oblivious Data Access Mechanisms},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/863},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/863}
}
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