Paper 2024/873 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2024/873 ↗

Cryptanalysis of Algebraic Verifiable Delay Functions

Alex Biryukov
Ben Fisch
Gottfried Herold
Dmitry Khovratovich
Gaëtan Leurent
María Naya-Plasencia
Benjamin Wesolowski
Abstract

Verifiable Delay Functions (VDF) are a class of cryptographic primitives aiming to guarantee a minimum computation time, even for an adversary with massive parallel computational power. They are useful in blockchain protocols, and several practical candidates have been proposed based on exponentiation in a large finite field: Sloth++, Veedo, MinRoot. The underlying assumption of these constructions is that computing an exponentiation $x^e$ requires at least $\log_2 e$ sequential multiplications. In this work, we analyze the security of these algebraic VDF candidates. In particular, we show that the latency of exponentiation can be reduced using parallel computation, against the preliminary assumptions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-06-01: last updated
2024-06-01: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/873
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/873,
      author = {Alex Biryukov and Ben Fisch and Gottfried Herold and Dmitry Khovratovich and Gaëtan Leurent and María Naya-Plasencia and Benjamin Wesolowski},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of Algebraic Verifiable Delay Functions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/873},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/873}
}
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