Paper 2025/011 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/011 ↗

DL-SCADS: Deep Learning-Based Post-Silicon Side-Channel Analysis Using Decomposed Signal

Dipayan Saha
Farimah Farahmandi
Abstract

Side-channel analysis (SCA) does not aim at the algorithm's weaknesses but rather its implementations. The rise of machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) is giving adversaries advanced capabilities to perform stealthy attacks. In this paper, we propose DL-SCADS, a DL-based approach along with signal decomposition techniques to leverage the power of secret key extraction from post-silicon EM/power side-channel traces. We integrate previously proven effective ideas of model ensembling and automated hyperparameter tuning with signal decomposition to develop an efficient and robust side-channel attack. Extensive experiments are performed on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to demonstrate the efficacy of our approach. The evaluation of the performance of the side-channel attack employing various decomposition techniques and comparison with the proposed approach in a range of datasets are also tabulated.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-01-02: last updated
2025-01-02: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/011
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/011,
      author = {Dipayan Saha and Farimah Farahmandi},
      title = {DL-SCADS: Deep Learning-Based Post-Silicon Side-Channel Analysis Using Decomposed Signal},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/011},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/011}
}
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