Paper 2025/080 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/080 ↗
Breaking verifiability and vote privacy in CHVote
Abstract
Abstract. CHVote is one of the two main electronic voting systems developed in the context of political elections in Switzerland, where the regulation requires a specific setting and specific trust assumptions. We show that actually, CHVote fails to achieve vote secrecy and individual verifiability (here, recorded-as-intended), as soon as one of the online components is dishonest, contradicting the security claims of CHVote. In total, we found 9 attacks or variants against CHVote, 2 of them being based on a bug in the reference implementation. We confirmed our findings through a proof-of-concept implementation of our attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-04-18: last updated
- 2025-01-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/080
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/080,
author = {Véronique Cortier and Alexandre Debant and Pierrick Gaudry},
title = {Breaking verifiability and vote privacy in CHVote},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/080},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/080}
}