Paper 2025/1050 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/1050 ↗
Integral Resistance of Block Ciphers with Key Whitening by Modular Addition
Abstract
Integral attacks exploit structural weaknesses in symmetric cryptographic primitives by analyzing how subsets of inputs propagate to produce outputs with specific algebraic properties. For the case of (XOR) key-alternating block ciphers using (independent) round keys, at ASIACRYPT'21, Hebborn et al. established the first non-trivial lower bounds on the number of rounds required for ensuring integral resistance in a quite general sense. For the case of adding keys by modular addition, no security arguments are known so far. Here, we present a unified framework for analyzing the integral resistance of primitives using (word-wise) modular addition for key whitening, allowing us to not only fill the gap for security arguments, but also to overcome the heavy computational cost inherent in the case of XOR-whitening.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-06-05: last updated
- 2025-06-05: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1050
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1050,
author = {Christof Beierle and Phil Hebborn and Gregor Leander and Yevhen Perehuda},
title = {Integral Resistance of Block Ciphers with Key Whitening by Modular Addition},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1050},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1050}
}