Paper 2025/119 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/119 ↗

SoK: PQC PAKEs - Design, Security and Performance

Nouri Alnahawi
David Haas
Erik Mauß
Alexander Wiesmaier
Abstract

Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) establishes secure communication channels using passwords for authentication. Currently, standardized PAKEs rely on classical asymmetric cryptography. However, these PAKEs may become insecure should the expected quantum threat become a reality. Despite the growing interest in realizing quantum-safe PAKEs, they did not receive much attention from the ongoing Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) integration efforts. Hence, there is a significant awareness gap compared to PQC primitives subject to the official standardization processes. We provide a comprehensive overview of existing PQC PAKEs, classify their design rationales and authentication methods, and address aspects related to their security and performance. We identify PAKE designs that are still unexplored in the PQC realm and discuss the possibility of their adaptation. Thus, we offer a detailed reference for future work on PQC PAKEs.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-09-11: last updated
2025-01-26: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/119
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/119,
      author = {Nouri Alnahawi and David Haas and Erik Mauß and Alexander Wiesmaier},
      title = {SoK: PQC PAKEs - Design, Security and Performance},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/119},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/119}
}
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