Paper 2025/1222 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/1222 ↗
SoK: Reassessing Side-Channel Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in PQC Implementations
Abstract
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms should remain secure even in the presence of quantum computers. Although the security of such schemes is guaranteed at the algorithmic level, real-world implementations often suffer from other vulnerabilities like Side-Channel Attacks (SCA). This Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper investigates side-channel attacks targeting implementations of PQC algorithms. This work categorizes attacks from an adversarial perspective to identify the most vulnerable components of the algorithms' implementations and highlights unexplored parts in current implementations. In addition, it reviews and analyzes the efficiency and efficacy of existing countermeasures to SCA in current hardware implementations. This approach helps identify countermeasures that provide broader protection and highlights characteristics needed for future secure implementations. Our findings offer guidance in strengthening existing systems and developing more efficient defenses against side-channel attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-06-30: last updated
- 2025-06-30: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1222
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1222,
author = {Patrik Dobias and Azade Rezaeezade and Łukasz Chmielewski and Lukas Malina and Lejla Batina},
title = {SoK: Reassessing Side-Channel Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in PQC Implementations},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1222},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1222}
}