Paper 2025/1337 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/1337 ↗

Electrum: UC Fail-Stop Server-Supported Signatures

Nikita Snetkov
Jelizaveta Vakarjuk
Peeter Laud
Abstract

Migration to quantum-safe cryptography represents a significant technological shift, addressing the vulnerabilities of traditional cryptographic primitives, such as KEMs and digital signatures. Yet, a number of challenges remain, especially in the development of secure solutions for sophisticated cryptographic applications. One of them is Smart-ID, European server-supported (threshold) signing service. To address this issue, we present $\textsf{Electrum}$, a fail-stop server-supported signature scheme designed to enhance security of existing Smart-ID service. $\textsf{Electrum}$ combines multiprime RSA-based signatures with fail-stop features: providing not only unforgeability against classical adversaries but also allowing to prove that a given signature is a forgery made by classical and/or quantum adversaries. Proposed protocol can be seen as a temporary remedy against the quantum threat until standardised threshold signature schemes become a common practice. To prove security of $\textsf{Electrum}$, we introduce a new ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}^{\textsf{SplFS}}$ for a fail-stop server-supported signing in the Universal Composability model. We show that $\textsf{Electrum}$ protocol securely realizes the proposed functionality $\mathcal{F}^{\textsf{SplFS}}$.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-10-30: last updated
2025-07-22: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1337
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1337,
      author = {Nikita Snetkov and Jelizaveta Vakarjuk and Peeter Laud},
      title = {Electrum: UC Fail-Stop Server-Supported Signatures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1337},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1337}
}
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