Paper 2025/1345 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/1345 ↗

SLVer Bullet: Straight-Line Verification for Bulletproofs

Brandon Goodell
Rigo Salazar
Freeman Slaughter
Luke Szramowski
Abstract

Eagen introduced a framework for proof-of-computation over elliptic curves, replacing costly group operations with efficient computations over a function field. This work lacks clear protocol descriptions, formal security proofs, and a thorough efficiency analysis; we improve upon the literature, present a detailed protocol description, then analyze completeness, soundness, and complexity. We apply our construction to the Schnorr and Bulletproofs protocols, highlighting how this reduces verifier costs significantly compared to the original proposals. This tradeoff most clearly benefits privacy-centered constructions like blockchain cryptocurrencies and Tor routing - where proofs must be verified repeatedly - but more generally may be used to improve verification time in generic curve-based zero-knowledge proof systems.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-01-13: last updated
2025-07-23: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1345
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1345,
      author = {Brandon Goodell and Rigo Salazar and Freeman Slaughter and Luke Szramowski},
      title = {SLVer Bullet: Straight-Line Verification for Bulletproofs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1345},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1345}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.