Paper 2025/139 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/139 ↗

Path Privacy and Handovers: Preventing Insider Traceability Attacks During Secure Handovers

Rabiah Alnashwan
Benjamin Dowling
Bhagya Wimalasiri
Abstract

The rise of 5G and IoT has shifted secure communication from centralized and homogeneous to a landscape of heterogeneous mobile devices constantly travelling between myriad networks. In such environments, it is desirable for devices to securely extend their connection from one network to another, often referred to as a handover. In this work we introduce the first cryptographic formalisation of secure handover schemes. We leverage our formalisation to propose path privacy, a novel security property for handovers that has hitherto remained unexplored. We further develop a syntax for secure handovers, and identify security properties appropriate for secure handover schemes. Finally, we introduce a generic handover scheme that captures all the strong notions of security we have identified, combining our novel path privacy concept with other security properties characteristic to existing handover schemes, demonstrating the robustness and versatility of our framework.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-01-28: last updated
2025-01-28: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/139
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/139,
      author = {Rabiah Alnashwan and Benjamin Dowling and Bhagya Wimalasiri},
      title = {Path Privacy and Handovers: Preventing Insider Traceability Attacks During Secure Handovers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/139},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/139}
}
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