Paper 2025/1412 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/1412 ↗

AVPEU: Anonymous Verifiable Presentations with Extended Usability

Yalan Wang
Liqun Chen
Yangguang Tian
Long Meng
Christopher J.P. Newton
Abstract

The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has established standards for decentralized identities (DIDs) and verifiable credentials (VCs). A DID serves as a unique identifier for an entity, while a VC validates specific attributes associated with the DID holder. To prove ownership of credentials, users generate verifiable presentations (VPs). To enhance privacy, the W3C standards advocate for randomizable signatures in VC creation and zero-knowledge proofs for VP generation. However, these standards face a significant limitation: they cannot effectively verify cross-domain credentials while maintaining anonymity. In this paper, we present Anonymous Verifiable Presentations with Extended Usability (AVPEU), a novel framework that addresses this limitation through the introduction of a notary system. At the technical core of AVPEU lies our proposed randomizable message-hiding signature scheme. We provide both a generic construction of AVPEU and specific implementations based on Boneh-Boyen-Shacham (BBS), Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL), and Pointcheval-Sanders (PS) signature. Our experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of these schemes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-08-02: last updated
2025-08-02: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1412
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1412,
      author = {Yalan Wang and Liqun Chen and Yangguang Tian and Long Meng and Christopher J.P. Newton},
      title = {AVPEU: Anonymous Verifiable Presentations with Extended Usability},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1412},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1412}
}
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