Paper 2025/1683 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/1683 ↗
Proving the Security of PeerDAS without the AGM
Abstract
Data availability sampling (DAS) enables clients to verify availability of data without downloading it entirely. This concept is crucial to Ethereum's roadmap. An instantiation of this concept, known as PeerDAS, relies at its core on a variant of KZG polynomial commitments and is set to be integrated into Ethereum. To assess the security of PeerDAS, Wagner and Zapico (ePrint 2024) provided a formal analysis, proving its security as a cryptographic primitive. However, their proof relies on the algebraic group model - an idealized framework known to be uninstantiable (Zhandry, CRYPTO 2022). In this work, we establish the security of \peerdas in the standard model under falsifiable assumptions. Specifically, we eliminate reliance on the algebraic group model and instead base our proof on the ARSDH assumption (Lipmaa et al., EUROCRYPT 2024), thus strengthening the theoretical foundations of PeerDAS and enhancing confidence in its security.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-09-16: last updated
- 2025-09-16: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1683
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1683,
author = {Benedikt Wagner and Arantxa Zapico},
title = {Proving the Security of PeerDAS without the AGM},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1683},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1683}
}