Paper 2025/1745 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/1745 ↗
Fault Attacks on MPCitH Signature Schemes
Abstract
In this work, we present two fault attacks against MPCitH-based signature schemes: we present a key recovery attack and a signature forgery attack, both of which only need a single successful fault injection to succeed. We analyze all five MPCitH-based schemes which are currently analyzed in round 2 of NIST's additional signature standardization process: Mirath, MQOM, PERK, RYDE, and SDitH. Our analysis shows that all five schemes are vulnerable to at least one of the attacks. We validate the practicality of our attacks using the ChipWhisperer setup and discuss countermeasures to prevent the attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-01-29: last updated
- 2025-09-24: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1745
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1745,
author = {Harrison Banda and Jan Brinkmann and Juliane Krämer},
title = {Fault Attacks on MPCitH Signature Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1745},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1745}
}