Paper 2025/1929 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/1929 ↗
Cryptanalysis of a Post-Quantum Signature Scheme Based on Number-Theoretic Assumptions
Abstract
The asymmetric cryptographic constructions upon on number- theoretic hardness assumptions have become insecure, due to Shor’s quantum algorithm and they will be vulnerable to large scale quantum computers. Hence, the adaption to quantum-resistant cryptosystems is a major task. Digital signatures, being a fundamental primitive in nu- merous applications. Recently, a new approach by Nguyen et al. [9] has claimed post-quantum security by basing the signature algorithm’s se- curity on a variant of the discrete logarithm problem. In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis of this construction and demonstrate a practi- cal forgery attack that allows generating an unlimited number of valid signatures—without access to a signing oracle.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-10-15: last updated
- 2025-10-15: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1929
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1929,
author = {Agha Aghayev and Nour-eddine Rahmani},
title = {Cryptanalysis of a Post-Quantum Signature Scheme Based on Number-Theoretic Assumptions},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1929},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1929}
}