Paper 2025/2264 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/2264 ↗
Leakage-Resilient Multi-Party Computation: Protecting the Evaluator in Circuits Garbling
Abstract
Garbling schemes allow two parties to compute a joint function on private inputs without revealing them. Yet, a semi-honest garbler might exploit hardware/software sidechannel leakages from the evaluator. An alarming threat with no concrete solution yet. Using the homomorphic properties of ElGamal encryption, we can prevent such leakage-based attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-12-17: last updated
- 2025-12-17: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/2264
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/2264,
author = {Francesco Berti and Itamar Levi},
title = {Leakage-Resilient Multi-Party Computation: Protecting the Evaluator in Circuits Garbling},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/2264},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2264}
}