Paper 2025/258 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/258 ↗

MPC with Publicly Identifiable Abort from Pseudorandomness and Homomorphic Encryption

Marc Rivinius
Abstract

Publicly identifiable abort is a critical feature for ensuring accountability in outsourced computations using secure multiparty computation (MPC). Despite its importance, no prior work has specifically addressed identifiable abort in the context of outsourced computations. In this paper, we present the first MPC protocol that supports publicly identifiable abort with minimal overhead for external clients. Our approach minimizes client-side computation by requiring only a few pseudorandom function evaluations per input. On the server side, the verification process involves lightweight linear function evaluations using homomorphic encryption. This results in verification times of a few nanoseconds per operation for servers, with client overhead being approximately two orders of magnitude lower. Additionally, the public verifiability of our protocol reduces client input/output costs compared to SPDZ-based protocols, on which we base our protocol. For example, in secure aggregation use cases, our protocol achieves over twice the efficiency during the offline phase and up to an 18 % speedup in the online phase, significantly outperforming SPDZ.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-05-12: last updated
2025-02-17: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/258
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/258,
      author = {Marc Rivinius},
      title = {MPC with Publicly Identifiable Abort from Pseudorandomness and Homomorphic Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/258},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/258}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.