Paper 2025/348 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/348 ↗

Juicebox Protocol: Distributed Storage and Recovery of Secrets Using Simple PIN Authentication

Nora Trapp
Diego Ongaro
Abstract

Existing secret management techniques demand users memorize complex passwords, store convoluted recovery phrases, or place their trust in a specific service or hardware provider. We have designed a novel protocol that combines existing cryptographic techniques to eliminate these complications and reduce user complexity to recalling a short PIN. Our protocol specifically focuses on a distributed approach to secret storage that leverages Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) and a Secret-Sharing Scheme (SSS) combined with self-destructing secrets to minimize the trust placed in any singular server. Additionally, our approach allows for servers distributed across organizations, eliminating the need to trust a singular service operator. We have built an open-source implementation of the client and server sides of this new protocol, the latter of which has variants for running on commodity hardware and secure hardware.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-02-25: last updated
2025-02-25: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/348
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/348,
      author = {Nora Trapp and Diego Ongaro},
      title = {Juicebox Protocol: Distributed Storage and Recovery of Secrets Using Simple PIN Authentication},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/348},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/348}
}
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