Paper 2025/421 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/421 ↗

A Note on Obfuscation-based Attacks on Private-coin Evasive LWE

Tzu-Hsiang Huang
Wei-Hsiang Hung
Shota Yamada
Abstract

The evasive learning with errors (evasive LWE) assumption is a new assumption recently introduced by Wee (Eurocrypt 2022) and Tsabary (Crypto 2022) independently, as a significant strengthening of the standard LWE assumption. While the assumption is known to imply various strong primitives including witness encryption [Wee22,Tsabary22], the assumption in the most general case (i.e., the private coin variant) is considered quite implausible due to the obfuscation based attack mentioned in [Wee22]. This obfuscation based attack is then later formalized by Vaikuntanathan, Wee, and Wichs [VWW22]. In this note, we revisit their attack and show that the attack actually does not work by showing a concrete counterexample. We then show that their attack can be made valid with some modifications. Along the way, we also improve the counterexample by making it provable. Specifically, our counterexample is valid assuming the (plain) LWE assumption and the existence of instance-hiding witness encryption, whereas their original counterexample was dependent on the heuristic assumption of the existence of an ideal obfuscation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-03-05: last updated
2025-03-05: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/421
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/421,
      author = {Tzu-Hsiang Huang and Wei-Hsiang Hung and Shota Yamada},
      title = {A Note on Obfuscation-based Attacks on Private-coin Evasive LWE},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/421},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/421}
}
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