Paper 2025/456 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/456 ↗
A Democratic Distributed Post-Quantum Certificateless Encryption Scheme
Abstract
We propose a post-quantum certificateless encryption scheme based on a web of trust instead of a centralized Key Generation Center. Our scheme allows nodes to communicate securely. It is the nodes already present in the network that vote on the acceptance of new nodes, and agree on the shared key. The threshold required for the acceptance of a new node is configurable. Our protocol thus allows to completely operate without the Key Generation Center (or Key Distribution Center). Our scheme is based on Quasi-Cyclic Moderate Density Parity Check Code McEliece, which is resistant to quantum computer attacks. The voting system uses Shamir secret sharing, coupled with the Kabatianskii-Krouk-Smeets signature scheme, both are also resistant to quantum computer attacks. We provide a security analysis of our protocol, as well as a formal verification and a proof of concept code.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-08-22: last updated
- 2025-03-11: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/456
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/456,
author = {Thomas Prévost and Bruno Martin and Olivier Alibart},
title = {A Democratic Distributed Post-Quantum Certificateless Encryption Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/456},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/456}
}