Paper 2025/481 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/481 ↗

RHQC: post-quantum ratcheted key exchange from coding assumptions

Julien Juaneda
Marina Dehez-Clementi
Jean-Christophe Deneuville
Jérôme Lacan
Abstract

Key Exchange mechanisms (KE or KEMs) such as the Diffie-Hellman protocol have proved to be a cornerstone conciliating the efficiency of symmetric encryption and the practicality of public key primitives. Such designs however assume the non-compromission of the long term asymmetric key in use. To relax this strong security assumption, and allow for modern security features such as Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) or Post Compromise Security (PCS), Ratcheted-KE (RKE) have been proposed. This work proposes to turn the Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) cryptosystem into such a Ratcheted-KE, yielding the first code-based such construction. Interestingly, our design allows indifferently one party to update the key on-demand rather than the other, yielding a construction called bi-directional RKE, which compares favorably to generic transformations. Finally, we prove that the resulting scheme satisfies the usual correctness and key-indistinguishability properties, and suggest concrete sets of parameters, assuming different real-life use cases.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-03-13: last updated
2025-03-13: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/481
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/481,
      author = {Julien Juaneda and Marina Dehez-Clementi and Jean-Christophe Deneuville and Jérôme Lacan},
      title = {RHQC: post-quantum ratcheted key exchange from coding assumptions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/481},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/481}
}
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