Paper 2025/482 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/482 ↗

An Efficient Sequential Aggregate Signature Scheme with Lazy Verification

Arinjita Paul
Sabyasachi Dutta
Kouichi Sakurai
C. Pandu Rangan
Abstract

A sequential aggregate signature scheme (SAS) allows multiple potential signers to sequentially aggregate their respective signatures into a single compact signature. Typically, verification of a SAS signatures requires access to all messages and public key pairs utilized in the aggregate generation. However, efficiency is crucial for cryptographic protocols to facilitate their practical implementation. To this end, we propose a sequential aggregate signature scheme with lazy verification for a set of user-message pairs, allowing the verification algorithm to operate without requiring access to all messages and public key pairs in the sequence. This construction is based on the RSA assumption in the random oracle model and is particularly beneficial in resource constrained applications that involve forwarding of authenticated information between parties, such as certificate chains. As an extension of this work, we introduce the notion of sequentially aggregatable proxy re-signatures that enables third parties or proxies to transform aggregatable signatures under one public key to another, useful in applications such as sharing web certificates and authentication of network paths. We also present a construction of a sequential aggregate proxy re-signature scheme, secure in the random oracle model, based on the RSA assumption, which may be of independent interest.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-03-13: last updated
2025-03-13: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/482
License
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/482,
      author = {Arinjita Paul and Sabyasachi Dutta and Kouichi Sakurai and C. Pandu Rangan},
      title = {An Efficient Sequential Aggregate Signature Scheme with Lazy Verification},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/482},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/482}
}
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