Paper 2025/541 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/541 ↗
Physical Design-Aware Power Side-Channel Leakage Assessment Framework using Deep Learning
Abstract
Power side-channel (PSC) vulnerabilities present formidable challenges to the security of ubiquitous microelectronic devices in mission-critical infrastructure. Existing side-channel assessment techniques mostly focus on post-silicon stages by analyzing power profiles of fabricated devices, suffering from low flexibility and prohibitively high cost while deploying security countermeasures. While pre-silicon PSC assessments offer flexibility and low cost, the true nature of the power signatures cannot be fully captured through RTL or gate-level design. Although physical design-level analysis provides precise power traces, collecting data is time and resource-consuming at the layout level. To address this challenge, we propose, for the first time, a fast and efficient physical design-level PSC assessment framework using a graph neural network (GNN). This framework predicts dynamic power traces for new layouts, using them to assess physical design security through metrics evaluation. Our experiments on AES-GF layout implementations achieve a tremendous 133 times speedup compared to conventional simulation-based flow without sacrificing substantial accuracy.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-03-24: last updated
- 2025-03-24: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/541
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/541,
author = {Dipayan Saha and Jingbo Zhou and Farimah Farahmandi},
title = {Physical Design-Aware Power Side-Channel Leakage Assessment Framework using Deep Learning},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/541},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/541}
}