Paper 2025/565 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/565 ↗
Attacking soundness for an optimization of the Gemini Polynomial Commitment Scheme
Abstract
We demonstrate an attack on the soundness of a widely known optimization of the Gemini multilinear Polynomial Commitment Scheme (PCS). The attack allows a malicious prover to falsely claim that a multilinear polynomial takes a value of their choice, for any input point. We stress that the original Gemini multilinear PCS and HyperKZG, an adaptation of Gemini, are not affected by the attack.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-03-27: last updated
- 2025-03-27: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/565
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/565,
author = {Lydia Garms and Michael Livesey},
title = {Attacking soundness for an optimization of the Gemini Polynomial Commitment Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/565},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/565}
}