Paper 2025/588 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/588 ↗

A Place for Everyone vs Everyone in its Place: Measuring and Attacking the Ethereum Global Network

Abstract

The Ethereum Global Network (EGN) is the peer-to-peer (P2P) network underlying Ethereum and thousands of subsequent blockchain services. Deviating from traditional single-service P2P networks, EGN's multi-service architecture has gained widespread acceptance for supposedly improving node discovery efficiency and security. This paper challenges this belief by critically examining EGN's design and its purported benefits. Our analysis reveals significant shortcomings in EGN's node discovery process. EGN nodes struggle to connect with peers offering the desired service: over three-quarters of connection attempts reach nodes of other services. In an extreme case, one node spent an average of $45\,908$ connection attempts to find each neighbor. Moreover, this blended architecture compromises EGN's security. The network demonstrates high susceptibility to DHT pollution and partition attacks. Even with only $300$ malicious nodes in EGN, an attacker can isolate thousands of nodes, significantly hindering recovery. In contrast, such a small number of malicious nodes has minimal impact on every single-service P2P network. We propose solutions to improve EGN's node discovery efficiency and strengthen its resilience against attacks.