Paper 2025/604 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/604 ↗
On the success rate of simple side-channel attacks against masking with unlimited attack traces
Abstract
Side-channel attacks following a classical differential power analysis (DPA) style are well understood, along with the effect the mask- ing countermeasure has on them. However, simple attacks (SPA) where the target variable does not vary thanks to a known value, such as the plaintext, are less studied. In this paper, we investigate how the masking countermeasure affects the success rate of simple attacks. To this end, we provide theoretical, simulated, and practical experiments. Interestingly, we will see that masking can allow us to asymptotically recover more information on the secret than in the case of an unprotected implemen- tation, depending on the masking type. We will see that this is true for masking encodings that add non-linearity with respect to the leakages, such as arithmetic masking, while it is not for Boolean masking. We be- lieve this context provides interesting results, as the average information of arithmetic encoding is proven less informative than the Boolean one.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-01-13: last updated
- 2025-04-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/604
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/604,
author = {Aymeric Hiltenbrand and Julien Eynard and Romain Poussier},
title = {On the success rate of simple side-channel attacks against masking with unlimited attack traces},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/604},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/604}
}